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Abstract 
 
 Reasoning, problem solving, comprehension, learning and retrieval, inhibition, switching, 
updating, or multitasking are often referred to as higher cognition, thought to require control 
processes or the use of a central executive. However, the concept of an executive controller 
begs the question of what is controlling the controller and so on, leading to an infinite 
hierarchy of executives or ‘homunculi’. In what is now a QJEP citation classic, Baddeley 
(1996) referred to the concept of a central executive in cognition as a ‘conceptual ragbag’ that 
acted as a placeholder umbrella term for aspects of cognition that are complex, were poorly 
understood at the time, and most likely involve several different cognitive functions working 
in concert. He suggested that with systematic empirical research, advances in understanding 
might progress sufficiently to allow the executive concept to be ‘sacked’. This article offers 
an overview of the 1996 article and of some subsequent systematic research, and argues that 
after two decades of research, there is sufficient advance in understanding to suggest that 
executive control might arise from the interaction among multiple different functions in 
cognition that use different, but overlapping brain networks. The article concludes that the 
central executive concept might now be offered a dignified retirement. 
 
  
Reasoning, problem solving, comprehension, learning and retrieval, inhibition, switching, 
updating, setting and maintaining goals, or multitasking are often referred to as higher 
cognition, thought to require control processes or executive functions. Each is associated with 
separate programmes of research that explore the empirical phenomena associated with these 
human abilities, and their theoretical underpinnings. One approach to integrating 
understanding across these different scientific endeavours is to consider the human cognitive 
architecture that supports these abilities: To explore whether cognitive functions that support 
reasoning might also be important for language comprehension, the ability to inhibit 
irrelevant information, to maintain goals, or to carry out multiple overlapping tasks. This was, 
and is a primary focus for understanding executive functions in the context of human working 
memory: The ability to maintain and update mental representations of rapid changes in our 
environment, to undertake ongoing mental processing, and to interact with the world on a 
moment to moment basis. A landmark paper in the understanding of executive functions in 
working memory was published by Baddeley (1996) in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology (QJEP), considered now a QJEP classic with over 2300 citations at the time of 
writing (Google Scholar, July  2015). 
 
The importance and influence of the Baddeley (1996) paper is best understood by first 
considering the scientific context that was established 22 years earlier. Baddeley and Hitch 
(1974) described a series of experiments exploring the relationship between short-term verbal 
memory and what they and others (e.g. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Broadbent, 1958) referred 
to as control processes for everyday tasks such as learning and retrieval, language 
comprehension, and reasoning. Together, the temporary memory and control processes were 
considered by Baddeley and Hitch as components of a working memory system. During the 
following two decades, Baddeley and his colleagues focused on the characteristics of verbal 
short-term memory, which they viewed as comprising a phonological store and an 
articulatory rehearsal process. Subsequently these were referred to collectively as the 
articulatory loop (Baddeley, 1986) or phonological loop (Baddeley, 1992). There was less 
emphasis on the characteristics of short-term memory for visual or other non-verbal material, 
or on the control processes that Baddeley (1986) referred to as the central executive of 
working memory. In 1994, during the first international conference on working memory, in 
Cambridge, UK, Baddeley presented a series of studies that were directed at exploring the 
central executive concept in some detail, and these, along with other experiments were 
reported in the Baddeley (1996) paper published in a special issue of QJEP, edited by 
Graham Hitch and myself.  
 
The key finding in Baddeley and Hitch (1974) was that healthy adults can retain serial 
ordered sequences of three verbal items while they are undertaking demanding 
comprehension, reasoning, or free recall tasks, with no impact on the performance of serial 
verbal recall or of the concurrent task. Retaining an ordered sequence of six verbal items 
resulted in reduced performance of a concurrent demanding task, but the impact on 
performance was exactly the same regardless of the level of complexity of the concurrent 
reasoning, comprehension, or free recall task. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) argued that there is 
a short-term verbal memory system with a capacity of perhaps three or four items, that can 
function in parallel with the more complex processes of reasoning and language 
comprehension. However, when the capacity of that short-term verbal memory system is 
exceeded, then a  control process such as mental verbal rehearsal is required. Reasoning and 
comprehension perhaps overlap with rehearsal of the letters or consolidation of the letters in 
memory, but do not overlap with short-term storage unless the memory load exceeds the 
capacity of the short-term storage system. That is, verbal short-term memory and control 
processes only partially rely on overlapping cognitive resources. 
 
So, control processes function to support memory, but only when memory demands are high. 
However, this raises a major question as to the nature of those control processes; whether 
there is one flexible process that can support reasoning, language, problem solving, and 
creativity, or multiple such processes, each supporting a specific set of mental operations. 
Related questions spring to mind as to whether the control comes from previously learned 
and practiced cognitive skills and strategies, or from some overarching executive function 
that might be reflected in our conscious experience of controlling our mental and physical 
actions. The latter can lead to concerns about what is controlling the executive, what is 
controlling the controller, and so on, with the risk of having an infinite hierarchy of executive 
controllers or homunculi. The former avoids the humunculus problem but might be seen as 
too mechanistic, and begs the question as to how these control skills are acquired. How might 
control functions be implemented in the brain? Finally, as Baddeley himself noted, is the 
central executive concept essentially a convenient label or placeholder for all of the cognitive 
functions that are difficult to understand or explain: a conceptual ragbag? 
 
Baddeley tackled the above, seemingly intractable, questions in his 1996 paper first by 
dismissing two potential approaches. The first of these was to draw on evidence linking 
impairments of control functions to damage in areas of the prefrontal cortex. This evidence, 
he argued, could tell us something about where in the brain control functions are 
implemented, but would tell us little or nothing about how those control functions are 
organised or implemented in cognition. Rather than define these impairments in terms of 
neuroanatomy (frontal deficits), Baddeley proposed the term ‘dysexecutive syndrome’ to 
refer to the cognitive functional impairments observed. A similar argument that questions the 
explanatory value of using neuroanatomical loci to define cognitive functions has been 
applied to the accumulated evidence from functional brain imaging studies of healthy adults 
(e.g. Page, 2006). Knowing which areas of the brain become more active when performing a 
cognitive task might tell us very little about precisely what that area of the brain is doing in 
order to support task performance. Increasingly, the evidence seems to indicate that 
communication between different brain areas is rather more important for supporting 
complex cognition than any one specific area (e.g. Nijboer, Borst, van Rijn, & Taatgen, 2014; 
for reviews see Charlton & Morris, 2015; Courtney, Roth & Sala, 2007; Nagel & 
Lindenberger, 2015). 
 
The psychometric approach which attempted to link clusters of executive functions with 
measures of general intelligence, as well as with the frontal lobes was also viewed by 
Baddeley as unlikely to be fruitful. A range of studies available at the time and others 
published not long after the 1996 paper suggested that there were diverse executive functions 
that generated small positive intercorrelations, but they lacked the coherence that would be 
needed to support the concept of a unitary or general factor for executive functions (e.g. 
Duncan, Johnson, Swales & Freer, 1997; Duncan & Owen, 2000). This evidence indicated 
that multiple brain areas are involved in any one task, and that different brain networks might 
be deployed to meet the cognitive requirements of any given task. So, if researchers were to 
run a large battery of different tasks on a large number of healthy adults, then a factor 
analysis might yield a single factor that could be interpreted as a general mental ability. But 
that general ability might simply reflect the efficiency with which different brain areas 
communicate with one another, as well as the general health and efficiency of the areas that 
are communicating. It could be argued that this misses the possibility that different 
combinations of brain networks could underlie different task requirements. More on this topic 
later.  
 Baddeley’s favoured approach was to retain the homunculus as a placeholder, and over time, 
to use experimental and neuropsychological approaches to identify, and split off individual 
functions that were part of the homunculus bundle of poorly understood aspects of higher 
level cognition. This was a long-term strategy, but seemed to offer a more systematic 
approach that would eventually lead to the demise of the homunculus and its replacement 
with empirically supported multiple cognitive systems, each with a different and specific set 
of functions. Achieving this goal would then characterise executive control as arising from 
the operation of and interaction among these multiple systems rather than assuming a single 
executive controller. 
 
Identifying Control Processes 
 
In an initial attempt to identify possible control processes that typically were viewed as 
executive functions, Baddeley (1996) explored the state of the science for concurrent 
performance of two tasks, switching retrieval strategies, selective attention and inhibition, 
and maintenance and manipulation in long-term memory. Although those were treated as four 
separate topics in the 1996 paper, the first three all come under the broad concept of attention, 
so I will consider them under that heading, then discuss the possible involvement of long-
term memory, followed by a discussion of attempts to identify other possible executive 
functions. 
 
Selective attention, dividing attention and dual task performance 
 
Baddeley addressed the general concept of attention from several different perspectives, 
reflecting the view that attention tends to be a rather broad label for a range of different 
cognitive functions. One of these is the notion of spreading a limited capacity attention 
system across different, and possibly conflicting information and processes. A special case of 
this is the idea of dividing attention between two tasks, possibly with rapid switching 
between them. A second is the ability to switch attention between different retrieval 
strategies. Here, Baddeley focused on random generation of oral responses from a well-
learned set such as the alphabet or a number range. A third is the ability to focus attention on 
one set of information or cognitive processes while inhibiting others. A fourth, not considered 
in any detail by Baddeley or in the current article is the ability to maintain or sustain attention 
over a period of time. I will first consider each of the first three examples in turn. 
 
Performing two tasks concurrently 
 
Previous studies (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge & Thomson, 1984) had provided evidence that 
retrieval from long-term memory is largely automatic and unaffected by a concurrent 
attention demanding task. However, Baddeley argued that ensuring, for example, letters of 
the alphabet are output in a random order  requires switching between retrieval strategies. It 
also requires inhibition of the tendency to use the well learned alphabetical order, and 
keeping track of the frequency with which individual letters or short letter sequences are 
generated to avoid having too many repetitions.  
 
Doing two things at once is often described as dividing attention, a concept that assumes 
there is a single overall pool of attentional capacity that can be divided among a range of 
tasks being performed concurrently (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, Hara, 
Brubaker, & Lowenschuss-Erlich, 2014; Pashler & Johnston, 1998). This assumption 
necessarily implies that each of the concurrent tasks receives only some of the attentional 
capacity, and therefore should generate poorer performance on each task than if all of that 
capacity were to be devoted to a single task. Before and since 1996, a large volume of 
research has demonstrated overall reductions in performance that arise from attempting two 
tasks at the same time, or that closely follow one another. However, for many of these 
studies, the research focus has been on bottlenecks during initial perception or encoding of 
two or more concurrent stimuli, or during the  production of vocal or manual responses that 
compete for output (e.g. Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2014; Pashler, 1994). In these kinds of 
studies, attention refers to how the cognitive system interacts with the immediate 
environment, and to the limitations that arise when attempting to deal with multiple 
information sources and multiple possible actions. Often such studies place similar types of 
demands on cognition, such as both involving memory for words and numbers, or both 
involving visual presentation of stimuli and manual responses. Those kinds of tasks have 
been explored in the content of theories of selective attention, without specific reference to 
the Baddeley concept of working memory. Instead, Baddeley was referring to how the 
cognitive system handles the concurrent cognitive operations that are required for 
remembering and/or processing material that has already been encoded through perception, 
where the task requirements are dissimilar, and where there is no, or minimal competition 
among possible responses. That is, the dual task cognitive requirements are not confounded 
by task similarity or input and output conflicts.   
 
Baddeley (1996) referred to a series of experiments published 10 years earlier (Baddeley, 
Logie, Bressi, Della Sala, & Spinnler, 1986) in which healthy younger and older adults, and a 
group of individuals with Alzheimer’s disease were asked to remember and repeat back 
strings of random digits while they were tracking a moving target on a computer screen. 
Conflicts during input of the stimuli and output of responses were avoided by using aural 
presentation of each digit sequence for oral serial recall, and using a visual display for the 
moving target which was tracked with a hand-held stylus. Crucially, each participant was first 
assessed for his or her ability to perform each task on its own. So, each person was asked to 
repeat back random lists of digits, with the lists gradually increasing in length. The longest 
sequence that a participant could recall successfully was taken as their maximum capacity, or 
span, for oral serial recall following auditory presentation. Next, each participant was asked 
to use a stylus to follow a small, randomly moving target around a computer screen. The 
speed of the target gradually increased, and the maximum speed at which a participant could 
keep the stylus on the target for around 70% of the time was taken as their maximum 
capacity, or span, for visuo-motor tracking.  Finally, each participant was asked to follow the 
moving target at their own maximum speed while they listened to and orally recalled 
sequences of digits set at their own individual maximum sequence length. 
 
The procedure of titrating, or adjusting the demand of each task performed on its own, and 
using the individually titrated demand in the dual task condition has two advantages. First, 
each participant acted as their own single task control against which to assess the impact of 
dual task requirements, rather than relative to a control group. Second, it allowed us to equate 
single task performance across groups, with the older healthy participants and the Alzheimer 
participants, as well as the younger healthy participants, all being asked to perform close to 
their individual limits on each task performed on its own. So, if any individual or group 
performed poorly in the dual task condition, we could check whether this was because of the 
dual task demand or because they also performed poorly in one or other of the single tasks.  
If we assume that there is a single maximum attentional capacity, then pushing each 
participant to their personal best (span) for recalling digits, or for following a moving target 
should use most or all of that capacity within each single task condition. If we then ask 
people to perform two tasks, both of which are set at individually titrated maximum demand 
levels, then we might expect a very substantial reduction in overall performance when both 
tasks are performed concurrently. Results were rather surprising for the assumptions of 
divided attention. Far from the catastrophic reduction in performance under conditions of 
performing two very demanding tasks concurrently, the dual task performance levels for the 
healthy adults were around 80% to 85% of the single task performance for both tasks, and 
this did not differ between the younger and older participants. This suggested that the 
performance cost is very small when doing two very demanding but dissimilar tasks 
concurrently compared with performing each task on its own, as long as we avoid input and 
output bottlenecks. Moreover, older adults showed no age-related impact specifically of dual 
task performance. Younger and older healthy participants showed the same very modest cost 
to performance under dual task conditions. This is despite well established findings that older 
people perform more poorly than younger people on a very wide range of cognitive tasks (see 
reviews in Perfect & Maylor, 2000).  
 
Even more intriguing, is that the Alzheimer participants in the Baddeley et al. (1986) study 
showed a drop of around 40% in dual task performance compared with their own single task 
performance. This pointed to a specific dual task impairment in Alzheimer’s disease that was 
not present in healthy older people. The fact that such a specific impairment could be 
detected in the Alzheimer group suggests that in healthy people, performing two tasks 
concurrently may reflect a specific ability that is not affected by healthy ageing, but is 
affected by Alzheimer’s disease. Moreover, given the extensive evidence that older healthy 
people show clear reductions in attentional capacity, and specifically in the ability to divide 
attention (for a review see Kilb & Naveh-Benjamin, 2015), the lack of an age-related dual-
task impairment reported by  Baddeley et al. (1986), suggests that the particular task 
combination that they used did not place a heavy load on a limited attentional capacity.  
The original findings reported by Baddeley et al., (1986) were replicated and extended 
multiple times over the following thirty years (e.g. Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala & 
MacPherson, 2003; Della Sala, Cocchini, Logie & MacPherson, 2010; Foley, Cocchini, 
Logie & Della Sala, 2015; Logie, Cocchini, Baddeley & Della Sala, 2004; MacPherson, Della 
Sala, Logie & Wilcock, 2007; Ramsden, Kinsella, Ong & Storey, 2008; Sebastian, Menor 
and Elosua, 2006) while addressing potential criticisms of its interpretation, such as the 
argument that dual task is more difficult than single task for  someone with a damaged brain. 
As noted by Baddeley (1996), if the results for the Alzheimer patients were just due to overall 
task difficulty, then we would have expected to see an effect in the healthy older participants 
who generally achieve poorer cognitive performance than younger people with equivalent 
educational levels. However, the older and younger groups did not differ in dual task cost.  
 
Logie et al., (2004) tackled the difficulty criticism more directly by following the general 
procedure from Baddeley et al. (1986), but in the dual task condition one or other of the tasks 
varied systematically in demand from below individual capacity through measured capacity 
to a demand that was greater than measured capacity. When digit sequence length was fixed 
and tracking speed increased, the tracking performance dropped, but digit recall was 
completely unaffected in healthy younger and older adults as well as for Alzheimer 
participants. When tracking speed was fixed and the digit sequence length was increased, 
digit recall declined, but tracking performance was unaffected in all three groups. As in the 
Baddeley et al. (1986) study there was a small overall impact of dual task versus single task 
in the healthy adults, and much larger overall dual task impairment in the Alzheimer group, 
but the dual task cost did not vary as a function of task difficulty for the patients or the 
healthy controls. That is, the Alzheimer patients had a specific problem performing two tasks 
at the same time, regardless of how easy or difficult was each individual task. Likewise, the 
performance of the healthy older and younger controls was insensitive to overall dual task 
difficulty.These findings  are consistent with the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) result described 
earlier showing an insensitivity to increasing load when  combining a memory preload with a 
concurrent demanding task in healthy young adults.  
 
More recently, similar results have been found for temporary visual feature binding tasks. In 
these tasks, participants are presented briefly with a small array of colours, of shapes, or of 
colour-shape combinations. After a blank interval, a second array is shown, but with changes 
in one of the colours, or one of the shapes, or with two of the shapes swapping colours (e.g. 
Allen, Baddeley & Hitch, 2006; Colzato, Raffone & Hommel, 2006; Logie, Brockmole & 
Vandenbroucke, 2009; Treisman, 2006).  A range of studies has demonstrated that this kind 
of task is insensitive to cognitive changes in healthy ageing (Brockmole & Logie, 2013; 
Brockmole, Parra, Della Sala & Logie, 2008; Brown & Brockmole, 2010; Isella, Molteni, 
Mapelli, and Ferrarese, 2015; Rhodes, Parra & Logie, in press). Older healthy people show 
no greater drop in performance than do younger healthy people when detecting changes in 
colour alone or shape alone, compared with detecting changes in colour-shape combinations. 
However, people with Alzheimer’s disease show a very much larger drop than younger and 
older healthy people in temporary memory for binding, compared with memory for shapes 
alone or colours alone (Parra, Abrahams, Fabi, Logie, Luzzi & Della Sala, 2009; Parra, 
Abrahams, Logie, Mendez, Lopera & Della Sala, 2010). That is, Alzheimer’s disease, but not 
healthy ageing, appears to be associated with a specific impairment in the ability to remember 
arbitrary combinations of colour and shape on a temporary basis, pointing to what might be 
considered an executive ‘temporary binding’ of two different kinds of information. This set 
of findings complements Baddeley’s discussion about a control function that might be 
difficult to detect in healthy adults, but becomes apparent as a specific impairment in 
Alzheimer’s disease.  
 
At a cognitive level, the results described above identified at least one specific control 
function for dual task performance, and a possibly related function for temporary binding of 
colours and shapes. However, they leave a range of unanswered questions as to how this 
control function is implemented without an homunculus acting as a dual task coordinator or 
binding mechanism. One possible hypothesis is that when healthy adults perform two tasks 
that have very different cognitive and input/output requirements, then each task deploys a 
different brain network, and these networks can operate largely in parallel. For example, 
serial ordered oral recall of digit sequences has been shown to involve areas in the left 
hemisphere, including the inferior parietal gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, middle frontal 
gyrus and deep white matter structures in the frontal region (Logie, Venneri, Della Sala, 
Redpath & Marshall, 2003; Paulesu, Frith & Frakowiak, 1993). In contrast, visuo-motor 
tracking has been shown to involve left precentral and postcentral gyri, bilateral superior 
parietal lobules as well as the supplementary motor area, cerebellum, thalamus and 
hippocampus (e.g. Nijboer et al., 2014). Nijboer et al. (2014) asked participants to perform an 
n-back task, a tracking task and a tone-counting task, as single tasks and also as pairs of tasks 
concurrently. They demonstrated that when performing two concurrent tasks, the reduction in 
performance is closely related to the extent to which there is an overlap in the brain areas that 
are activated when performing each task on its own. When brain areas overlapped, as in the 
combination of n-back and tracking, there were clear reductions in performance under dual 
task compared with single task conditions. When there was little or no overlap in brain areas, 
as for tone counting and tracking, there was little or no reduction in performance when 
performing the two tasks concurrently compared with performing each task on its own. There 
appeared to be no evidence for an area of the brain specifically associated with a ‘dual task 
executive controller’. Rather, the cognitive performance under dual task conditions arose 
from how the brain networks interacted, and the extent to which they overlapped. Analogous 
findings have been reported for feature binding, with different, but partially overlapping areas 
of activation used for temporary memory for respectively colour and for shape, but with both 
areas activated together with additional prefrontal cortical areas when remembering colour-
shape combinations (Parra, Della Sala, Logie, & Morcom, 2014). 
 
The early stages of Alzheimer’s disease are known to damage brain white matter that 
provides neural connectivity between brain areas, particularly the white matter tracts between 
the anterior and posterior brain areas (e.g. Bokde, Ewers & Hampel, 2009). The amount of 
damage to white matter observed in Alzheimer’s disease is substantially greater than the 
gradual change in white matter that occurs in healthy ageing (Charlton & Morris, 2015). So, 
even if an individual network can still function, if connectivity with other brain areas is 
compromised then performance that relies on that connectivity will suffer. This offers a 
plausible account for the specific dual task impairment in Alzheimer’s disease with task 
combinations that show very little dual task cost in healthy younger and older participants. It 
also offers a plausible account for the specific feature binding deficit associated with the 
disease. Moreover, these findings may have broader clinical impact in pointing towards the 
possible use of dual task and binding paradigms to develop cognitive assessments that are 
specific for aiding the detection and monitoring of Alzheimer’s disease (Logie, Parra & Della 
Sala, 2015). 
 
The role of long-term memory 
 
Random generation 
Baddeley (1996) discussed two approaches to addressing the contribution to executive 
control functions from the lifetime of stored episodes, and of acquired knowledge and skills. 
One of these considered executive control of retrieval strategies through the use of random 
generation; the technique of asking participants to randomly generate items from well learned 
sets such as the alphabet or the numbers between 1 and 10. The other considered the 
possibility that working memory largely comprises activated long-term memory coupled with 
a focus of attention. 
 
Regarding retrieval strategies, a previous set of studies by Baddeley et al. (1984), provided 
evidence that retrieval of well known and well learned facts from long-term memory is 
largely automatic and unaffected by a concurrent attention demanding task. Baddeley argued 
that successful random output of items from a well learned set such as the alphabet requires 
switching between retrieval strategies. It also requires inhibition of the tendency to use the 
well learned alphabetical order, and requires the participant to keep track of the frequency 
with which individual letters or short letter sequences are generated to avoid having too many 
repetitions. Together, the requirement to switch retrieval strategies and to inhibit familiar 
sequences and repetitions were expected to disrupt retrieval from long-term memory. This 
proved to be the case, given that random generation disrupted the ability to generate 
examples of items from specific categories, such as fruit or animals, and affected scores on a 
standard test of fluid intelligence (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny & Duncan, 1998). Other 
studies showed that random generation disrupted simple counting of dots on a screen (Logie 
& Baddeley, 1987), syllogistic reasoning (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993), and 
mental arithmetic (Logie, Gilhooly & Wynn, 1994), consistent with Baddeley’s argument that 
random generation could be considered a task requiring executive control processes. 
 
The subsequent use of random generation varied between its role as a secondary task to 
investigate the effect of possible disruption of complex primary tasks, and the understanding 
of the random generation task itself. The use of the task was also complicated by the labour-
intensive scoring required of audio-recordings of lengthy orally generated sequences from 
each participant. One attempt to avoid this scoring problem involved random keypressing of a 
set of keys that allowed automated recording and scoring of responses. However, that 
approach removed the requirement to retrieve items from well-learned sets in long-term 
memory. An ingenious alternative was explored by Vandierendonck, De Vooght, and Goten 
(1998) who asked participants to generate random time intervals between taps on a single 
key. This allowed for automated recording and scoring, and also avoided the need to generate 
oral responses or spatially separated movements. It  offered a purer measure of the processes 
involved in inhibiting the repetition of sequences of inter-tap intervals of the same length. 
However, it also removed the requirement to retrieve items from long-term memory or to 
switch retrieval strategies. Although random interval tapping appeared to show some 
promise, it was rarely used in subsequent research. 
 
More recent studies have attempted to develop computational models of random generation, 
but these attempts run into the problem that oral random generation involves a range of 
cognitive functions. For example, Sexton and Cooper (2014) developed one model, but in so 
doing, came to the conclusion that random generation involves a range of different functions, 
each of which has to be incorporated in the model. This highlights a further issue about what 
precisely is meant by the term ‘executive function’. In the case of random generation, this 
might simply refer to the complexity of the requirement to deploy a range of different 
cognitive functions in concert to comply with task instructions. So, again, the notion of an 
executive might arise from the need for different functions to interact rather than referring to 
an overarching control mechanism. 
 
Activated long-term memory   
 
Here, Baddeley (1996) first briefly considered that people with dense amnesia show a broadly  
intact ability to recall material presented just a few seconds previously, and an ability to 
perform logical memory tests as well as to hold conversations. Yet, such individuals can 
remember little or nothing about those experiences when tested just 30 minutes later 
(Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Baddeley, 1988). It appeared that the executive 
abilities to activate previously learned skills and knowledge for language and logical 
reasoning as well as for comprehension and remembering short prose passages or an ongoing 
conversation was largely intact, but the ability to store that information over longer periods 
and retrieve it subsequently was severely impaired. Baddeley (1996) interpreted the intact 
functions as demonstrating intact executive involvement in temporary activation of long-term 
memory. He also recognised that even the so-called ‘slave system’ or domain-specific 
temporary verbal memory store, the phonological loop, requires access to the lifetime of 
acquired knowledge about phonology. How else could there be evidence for phonologically 
based errors when recalling visually presented word sequences or letter sequences (e.g. 
Conrad, 1964)? So, the operation of the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) working memory and its 
subsequent updates (Baddeley, 1986; 2000; 2007; 2012) clearly requires an interaction with 
long-term stored knowledge. 
 
In Baddeley (2000), there is the proposal of an extra component of working memory, referred 
to as the episodic buffer. This component is thought to support the binding of information 
from other working memory components and from long-term memory into a temporary but 
coherent and limited set of information chunks representing the current event. In amnesic 
patients, the episodic buffer is thought to be intact, reflected in largely normal executive 
functioning, coupled with severely impaired ability to recall material after a delay. In healthy 
individuals, most retrieval from long-term memory is thought to be relatively automatic, and 
the episodic buffer provides an interface between working memory and long-term memory 
viewed as two separate systems.   
 
Logie (1995, 2003; 2011) proposed an alternative view for the relationship between long-
term memory and working memory by proposing that incoming stimuli activate 
representations in long-term memory and that the product of those activations are transferred 
to multiple components in working memory. These components include a temporary visual 
buffer referred to as the visual cache, and a buffer for retaining movement sequences referred 
to as the inner scribe, as well as the components of the phonological loop, and the operation 
of a range of executive functions. The buffers and executive components of working memory 
then act together with activated long-term memory to support task performance, rather than 
support coming from a single memory system. Evidence for this view came from, for 
example, selective impairments in neuropsychological patients (Vallar & Shallice, 1990; 
Logie & Della Sala, 2005), domain specific interference effects in dual-task studies of 
healthy individuals, including the Baddeley et al. (1986) and Logie et al. (2004) studies 
mentioned earlier, and, more recently, studies of visual and phonological codes in serial recall 
tasks (Saito Logie, Morita & Law, 2008; Logie, Saito, Morita, Varma & Norris, in press). 
    
Other researchers have argued that working memory is not a separate system that interacts 
with long-term memory, but is essentially currently activated  long-term memory (e.g. 
Cowan, 1995; 1999; 2005; Crowder, 1993; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). For example, Ericsson 
and Kintsch (1995), referred to ‘long-term working memory’ to account for the ability of 
experts to hold in mind a great deal more information about their areas of expertise than 
would be expected from a limited capacity working memory. This has been demonstrated in a 
wide range of areas of expertise, notably in chess players (e.g. de Groot, 1965; Saariluoma, 
1990) and in expert restaurant serving staff (Ericsson, & Polson, 1988). Ericsson, Chase, and 
Falloon (1980) reported a notable single case of an individual (Falloon) who learned to repeat 
back random sequences of up to 80 digits. Other researchers have shown similar superior 
working memory performance in experts in soccer being asked to remember sets of scores 
from soccer matches (Morris, Tweedy & Gruneberg, 1985). Even residential burglars show 
superior visual working memory for burglary-related details in photographs of houses (Logie, 
Wright & Decker, 1992; Wright, Logie & Decker, 1995). However, a common theme across 
these studies is that the participants showed normal levels of working memory performance 
when asked to recall details that could not be supported by their specific expertise, such as 
when chess experts are asked to recall positions of pieces placed randomly on the board, 
when soccer experts are asked to remember random scores rather than scores from actual 
games, and when  burglars try to remember details of interest to house buyers such as the 
decoration of the doors. That is, knowledge and learned strategies retrieved from long-term 
memory can be used to generate high levels of memory performance within an individual’s 
areas of expertise. When performing tasks that cannot use these forms of expertise, memory 
performance is at the level expected from a limited capacity working memory system. 
Ericsson and Delaney (1999) recognised the need to maintain the concept of a short-term 
working memory to  remember novel details for short periods of time, complementing their 
concept of long-term working memory contributing to overall memory performance by 
drawing on acquired expertise.  
 
Cowan (1995; 1999; 2005) developed the idea of working memory as activated long-term 
memory, but added the idea of a limited capacity focus of attention on a small area of what is 
currently activated. This combination of activated long-term memory has been referred to as 
the ‘embedded processes model’ (Cowan, 1999). The focus of attention could be equated to 
an executive function for selective attention to a section of the current contents of activated 
long-term  memory or of the current contents of consciousness (for a recent discussion see 
Logie & Cowan, 2015). Cowan has reported substantial evidence for the notion of a focus of 
attention that can support temporary memory for 3 or 4 items at any one time (e.g. Chen & 
Cowan, 2005; Cowan, Chen & Rouder, 2004). However, precisely what controls the focus of 
attention in Cowan’s model is not entirely clear, and leaves open the homunculus question. 
Although Cowan argued primarily for this ‘unitary’ view of memory, rather than a  working 
memory system that is separate from long-term memory, subsequently (Cowan, Saults & 
Blume, 2014) acknowledged that there appeared to be peripheral systems, notably the 
phonological loop, that could support verbal rehearsal without drawing heavily on the limited 
capacity focus of attention. This is compatible with the phonological loop in the Baddeley 
model. However, Cowan views the focus of attention as the core of working memory 
function that allows for inhibition of currently irrelevant information as well as controlling 
which limited set of information is immediately available and relevant for the current task. 
 
Individual differences and executive functions 
 
While Baddeley and colleagues were developing the concept of executive functions using 
primarily experimental and neuropsychological approaches, an alternative approach was 
developed in parallel that viewed working memory as reflecting differences between 
individuals in their general mental capacity.   Daneman and Carpenter (1980) devised a task 
which involved reading (i.e. language processing) a series of sentences and then recalling the 
final word of each sentence. The measure of performance was based on the maximum number 
of sentences that could be processed while successfully recalling all of the final words in the order of 
presentation. Daneman and Carpenter and their colleagues demonstrated that people who were good 
at this task also were good at a wide range of other complex tasks, such as language comprehension. 
Likewise, people who were poor at the task also were poor at language comprehension. The 
researchers argued that their task was measuring a fundamental human mental ability that they 
referred to as working memory, and the task was referred to as a working memory span task. 
  
Subsequent studies developed different variations of the working memory span task. Most 
notably, Engle and colleagues (e.g., Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Turner & Engle, 1989) 
developed a version that they called ‘operation span’, in which people were given simple 
arithmetic sums, instead of sentences, followed in each case by an unrelated word. Variation 
in how many words people could remember when interspersed with arithmetic showed good 
correlations with performance on language comprehension, but also on a wide range of other 
tests of cognitive ability, including general intelligence and performance in exams. Engle et 
al. (1999) emphasised that the operation span task was a measure not only of memory, but 
rather was a measure of the capacity to control attention when memory is required along with 
interference or distraction. This led Kane and Engle (2002) to refer to the concept of 
‘executive attention’ which they viewed as the ability to inhibit distracting information. More 
recently, Shipstead, Harrison and Engle (2015) referred to working memory as the interaction 
between attention and memory. 
 
Individual differences in working memory span task scores have been very successful in 
predicting performance on a wide range of mentally challenging tasks, including measures of 
fluid intelligence (e.g. Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin & Conway, 1999; Hicks, Harrison & Engle, 
2015). However, there is accumulating evidence  that working memory span tasks might not 
actually be ideal measures  of working memory. Cantor and Engle (1993) argued that 
performance on the operation span task  might reflect how much information could be 
activated from long-term memory at any one time. The working memory element was then 
the ability to inhibit the impact of distraction, and to avoid an impact on memory from the 
intervening processing tasks. So, individuals with high operation spans are able to activate 
more information and are more effective at inhibiting distraction than are those with low 
operation spans. In this sense the ability to inhibit distraction is akin to one of Baddeley’s 
executive functions, but Engle and colleagues view the memory measure in working memory 
span tasks as activated long-term memory. This view  was reinforced in later studies by 
Unsworth and Engle (e.g. 2007). Further evidence that working memory span tasks might be 
measuring activated long-term memory rather than working memory was reported by Kane, 
Conway, Miura and Colflesh (2007) who demonstrated that individual differences in working 
memory span show low correlations with a widely used measure of working memory 
function known as the n-back task. In this task, participants are shown a series of items and 
are asked to decide if the currently presented item is the same as an item shown 1, 2, 3 or 
more items previously. As the stimulus list progresses, participants have to update their 
memory for the item that was ‘n-back’ in the series. So, n-back tests are thought to measure 
the capacity for rapidly updating the contents of working memory. The poor correlation 
between n-back scores and working memory span scores suggest that these two tasks are 
unlikely to be measuring the same cognitive functions. So, either there are at least two 
different functions of working memory - updating for n-back and inhibition of distraction for 
working memory span - or one of these tasks is not measuring a single attentional control 
function.   
 
A further reason for thinking that working memory span tasks might not be ideal for 
measuring working memory is that  the vast majority of studies that use these tasks score and 
report only the number of items recalled. As noted above, the memory demands of the task 
are increasingly viewed as reflecting storage through temporary activation of long-term 
memory representations of the items to be remembered rather than in a temporary buffer 
within working memory such as the phonological loop. Few studies in this area report 
performance on the processing element of the task which might offer a more direct measure 
of the ‘working’ or executive functions of working memory. One of the few exceptions was a 
study by Waters and Caplan (1996) who adapted a task originally described by Baddeley, 
Logie,  Nimmo-Smith, and Brereton (1985) in which participants verified (rather than only 
read) a series of simple sentences and were asked to remember the final word of each 
sentence. Crucially, Waters and Caplan measured performance on the verification 
(processing) element of the task as well as recall performance. If processing and memory 
both rely on the same limited capacity resource, then high levels of memory performance 
should result in low levels of processing performance and vice versa. So, we would expect 
large negative correlations between processing and memory performance in a working 
memory span task for list lengths that are close to maximum working memory capacity. In 
contrast, they found low to moderate positive correlations between processing and storage 
measures at all list lengths, not all of which were significant. When they generated a 
composite score that included both processing and memory performance, this yielded a 
correlation with other measures of high level cognition that was nearly double that obtained 
from the memory score alone. Similar patterns of poor correlations between processing and 
memory in working memory span tasks were reported by Daneman and Hannon (2007), and 
by Logie and Duff (2007), indicating that processing and memory in working memory span 
tasks make independent contributions to the variance that overlaps with general cognitive 
ability. Further studies by Duff and Logie (1999; 2001) demonstrated that performing a 
working memory span task that involves both processing and temporary memory results in 
very little overall reduction in performance compared with performing the processing task on 
its own or the memory task on its own. This suggests that processing and memory reflect 
largely independent, not interdependent cognitive functions. It is a conclusion that is 
compatible with Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) view that memory in a working memory span 
task might reflect secondary, or long-term memory activation whereas the inhibition of 
distraction is akin to an executive function of working memory. However, it remains puzzling 
that in studies of individual differences in working memory span, there is rarely consideration 
of measuring performance on the processing elements of the task, yet it is the processing 
elements that might reflect executive functions in working memory. 
 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, and Wager (2000) used the individual 
differences approach with a large battery of cognitive assessessments and a latent variable 
analysis to investigate whether a single factor or multiple factors might account for  executive 
function in working memory. They identified three separate executive functions: inhibition of 
automatic responses, updating of representations in working memory, and the ability to 
switch between tasks or mental representations. They also acknowledged that there was 
evidence for a function that might support the ability to carry out two tasks concurrently. In a 
follow up individual differences study of a large cohort of twins, Friedman, Miyake, Young, 
DeFries, Corley, & Hewitt (2008) offered evidence for a genetic basis for individual 
differences in each of the executive functions identified in the Miyake et al. (2000) study. 
Other studies have demonstrated that working memory functions appear to decline at 
different rates across the adult lifespan (e.g. Johnson, Logie & Brockmole, 2010; Kievet, 
Davis, Mitchell, Taylor, Duncan, Cam-CAN Research Team & Henson, 2014; Park, 
Lautenschlager, Hedden, Davidson, Smith & Smith, 2002; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009), and 
this is compatible with the view that there are multiple specialised functions that are 
differentially sensitive to age. So, the idea that there are multiple functions that previously 
might have been considered to be supported by an executive homunculus, is being replaced 
by multiple cognitive processes, each of which serves a specific function, with performance 
perhaps constrained by the effectiveness of neural communication. So, the homunculus could 
be considered an emergent property of how different brain networks interact and are 
deployed to meet task requirements, as suggested by the Nijboer et al. (2014) and Parra et al. 
(2014) studies discussed earlier.  
 
The arguments above could suggest that it is time for the concept of a single executive to be 
retired, and for us to consider that cognition could comprise a collection of multiple 
specialised skills, strategies and abilities that interact and act together as a self-organising 
system that does not require a central controller. There are certainly many examples of 
complex systems such as insect colonies that function very effectively with multiple 
specialised groups of individuals whose activities are controlled by the specialised functions 
within each group and by inter-group interactions rather than by a central executive 
controller. A range of computational models demonstrating executive control within self-
organising systems (e.g. Barnard, 1999; Willshaw, 2006) have been proposed but this kind of 
computational modelling has yet to be fully developed as an alternative approach to 
understanding executive control within the human brain.  
 
Conclusion 
Baddeley (1996) asked whether it would be reasonable to remove the homunculus or central 
executive as a theoretical place holder. He concluded that there appeared to be a limited 
evidence base to do so at that time, and recommended a long-term empirical strategy of 
attempting to identify and understand executive functions. In the following two decades, 
considerable progress has been made in the identification of cognition functions that were in 
the bailiwick of the homunculus. So, is it ready to retire? There is not scope here to offer a 
comprehensive review of 20 years of research on the topic, and detailed reviews are available 
elsewhere (e.g. Baddeley, 2007; 2012; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Logie, 2015; Logie & 
Morris, 2015; Logie & Niven, 2012). In this article, I have highlighted some of the research 
suggesting that communication between different cognitive functions could be identified as 
crucial for successful dual task performance and for successful temporary feature binding. 
Evidence from structural and functional brain imaging appears to support this interpretation. 
Selection and implementation of retrieval strategies appears to be a second form of executive 
process. Research on individual differences in working memory has identified three others, 
namely inhibition of distraction, updating, and task switching. 
 
So, if we can consider offering a dignified retirement to the homunculus with thanks for its 
function as a placeholder, can we also dismiss the idea of a single, general, limited capacity, 
but flexible attention system that remains a core feature of several, influential contemporary 
views of working memory (e.g. Cowan et al., 2014; Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Hicks et al., 
2015). Maybe we don’t have to, if we return to the concept of self-organising systems, and 
the kinds of research questions that each approach attempts to address (Logie, 2011; 2015). If 
the entymologist is interested in the overall capacity and performance of an insect colony, 
then the colony might be viewed and assessed as a single, complex entity that is successful or 
otherwise in surviving within its environment. The overall performance of different colonies 
can then be compared to assess their different levels of success in survival. If instead, the 
interest is in the structure of insect colonies, the functions of its different groups, and how 
those individual groups contribute to the overall performance of the colony, then the concept 
of a single complex entity is much less useful. So too, if the primary research questions 
concern the maximum mental capacity of an individual for performing relative to other 
individuals in research tasks or in life success, then viewing executive functions as reflecting 
a single, flexible, limited capacity attention system is extremely useful. If, instead, the focus 
of the research is on understanding how the overall capacity is achieved, and on the structure 
and function of working memory, even when it is not operating at maximum capacity (as 
commonly is the case in everyday life), then the accumulated evidence points to multiple 
specialised functions that can operate in concert to give the impression that there is a single 
entity that supports on-line cognition.    
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